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ABSTRACT
Stem cell innovation has enabled the growth of a global market of
treatments for a wide range of diseases but most of this market
operates outside the domain of orthodox forms of innovation
governance. Much of the analysis of this issue has adopted a supply side
perspective informed by the values of the orthodox scientiﬁc model of
biomedical innovation, arguing that national and transnational
regulation has failed to impose appropriate standards on the ‘illicit’
supply of stem cell treatments. In contrast, this paper shows how and
why the analysis of global stem cell innovation governance must
incorporate the market and health consumer demand into the
conceptual framework. Central to the argument is the role of innovation
models in mediating the relationship between demand and supply in
the global market of new stem cell treatments. Different models of
scientiﬁc and medical innovation mediate that relationship in different
ways and, in jurisdictions where health consumer demand is frustrated,
may result in parallel political demands for change in stem cell
innovation governance. Such demands are likely to be resisted by the
dominant scientiﬁc model, producing a further response from health
consumers and a continuing dynamic in the political economy of stem
cell treatments.
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Introduction
Health consumers regularly purchase treatment through a global health-care market with the
capacity to deliver both established and new forms of therapy. One new and rapidly developing
market is that of stem cell therapies where intervention occurs to replace or regenerate human
cells, tissue or organs in order to restore or establish normal function. Innovative treatments are avail-
able for a wide range of conditions, including spinal-cord injury, muscular dystrophy, optic nerve
hypoplasia (ONH), septo-optic dysplasia (SOD), Lyme Disease, diabetes, ataxia, cerebral palsy and Par-
kinson’s, with a potential market value projected to rise from $26 billion in 2011 to $119 billion in
2018 (Global Industry Analysts Inc. 2010, Transparency Market Research 2013). Hundreds of clinics
worldwide are treating thousands of patients (Table 1).
The major political difﬁculty confronting the governance of this global innovation market is that
the majority of the supply is from providers utilizing practice-based models of biomedical innovation
whilst only a very small supply has been generated by the orthodox science-based model of
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Brian Salter brian.g.salter@kcl.ac.uk
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2016.1198757
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
's 
Co
lle
ge
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 08
:52
 19
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
innovation. To date, much of the analysis of the governance problem has adopted a supply side per-
spective informed by the values of the orthodox model, arguing that national and transnational regu-
lation has failed to impose what are regarded as appropriate standards on the ‘illicit’ supply of stem
cell therapies. Within this analysis, the practice-based model of stem cell innovation used by stem cell
clinics is regarded as unproved, unsafe and illegitimate by supporters of the orthodox science-based
model of stem cell innovation and consumers who purchase such stem cell therapy products are
viewed as ill-informed ‘stem cell tourists’ (Barclay 2009, Dedmon 2009). International scientiﬁc organ-
isations such as the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) warn strongly against consu-
mer use of the clinics (Baker 2008), states with an established tradition of regulation in orthodox
biomedical innovation look to tighten their rules to prevent or restrict their operation (Fink 2010)
and bioethicists discuss how better to protect what are assumed to be vulnerable health consumers
from exploitation by what are assumed to be mercenary clinicians (Cohen and Cohen 2010).
In contrast, this paper presents a political economic analysis with a strong demand-side perspec-
tive, arguing that discussion of what is termed ‘stem cell tourism’ and how it should be governed can
more fruitfully be conducted within a framework focusing on the demand–supply relationship of the
health consumer market and its mediation by different models of stem cell innovation. Such a frame-
work allows us to understand the reality of the stem cell market dynamic, the very active role of
health consumers within it and hence the importance of governance policies that address the
demand side as well as the supply side of stem cell innovation. There is no presumption in this analy-
sis that one model of stem cell innovation is ethically superior to another.
The paper begins with the challenges posed by the rise of the global health consumer. What is the
nature of the economic and political demands by health consumers on the global health-care market,
how do the two types of demands interact, and what are their implications for the emergence of new
health treatments? Second, it examines the engagement between these demands and the supply
generated by different models of stem cell innovation governance. In what ways do innovation
models mediate between consumer demand and the emerging health-care supply? What are the
implications of this mediation for the competitive position of a particular model in the global stem
cell therapy market? Third, it relates the operation of this market dynamic to the existing structures
of national and transnational governance in stem cell innovation. What synergies and dissonances
are thus revealed in the interaction of market dynamic and governance form?
Global health consumers: economic and political demand
In large part, consumer demand for established and new forms of health care has traditionally been
mediated through the role of the doctor acting to deﬁne demand in terms of ‘clinical need’. In econ-
omic terms, an ‘agency relationship’ between professional and consumer characterised by an asym-
metry of information between a principal (an uninformed player) and an agent (an informed player)
who acts on behalf of the principal (Shackley and Ryan 1994). The distinctive and important dimen-
sion in health care is that the consumers’ agents (the doctors) are also the suppliers of health care. As
a consequence, and unlike other market situations, the utility functions of doctor and patient are no
longer independent but interdependent: the provider has interests which are partly congruent and
Table 1. The size of the stem cell therapy market in selected countries.
Country Number of clinics Number of patients
China >300 >30,000
India >45–50 >10,000
Russia >100 >20,000
Japan >20 >10,000
Data sources: China: China Ministry of Health, quoted by Sina (2013). India: Estimate calculated
from data from Cohen and Cohen (2010), Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner (2010), Ogbogu,
Rachul, and Caulﬁeld (2013), Pharmabiz (2014). Russia: Sipp (2011). Japan: Mainichini (2013).
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partly in conﬂict with those of the consumer. The control of this inherent instability in the traditional
model of the consumer–doctor relationship is dependent upon, ﬁrstly, the maintenance of public
trust in medical expertise as the only valid source of knowledge in the doctor–patient encounter
and, secondly, regulation of consumer access to alternative sources of information. If both these con-
ditions are fulﬁlled, then the operation of a health-care market where consumer and provider power
are more evenly balanced is prevented and medical hegemony maintained.
The rise of health consumerism to challenge the traditional model has taken a number of econ-
omic forms ranging from global access to common and standardised modes of orthodox treatment,
through the expansion of demand for complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), to the ‘direct
to consumer’ (DTC) internet-based market trading in pharmaceuticals and the new technologies of
genetic testing. Common to all is a re-assessment of the consumer–doctor relationship which,
Haug and Levin argue:
focuses on the purchaser’s (patient’s) rights and the seller’s (physician’s) obligations, rather than on the phys-
ician’s rights (to direct) and the patient’s obligations (to follow directions)… .In a consumer relationship, the
seller has no particular authority; if anything, legitimated power rests in the buyer who can make the decision
to buy or not to buy as he or she sees ﬁt. (Haug and Levin 1981: 213).
Accompanying this position may be the assumption that ‘consumerism implies the buyer’s challenge
of the seller’s claims… .an approach of doubt and caution, rather than faith and trust, in any trans-
action including the medical’ (Haug and Levin 1983: 10). The implications of this shift for the nature
and governance of the patient–doctor relationship are considerable. Effectively the market acts to
increase the sensitivity of doctors to patient needs and to the information that patients bring to
the patient–doctor transaction. In so doing, it brings to the fore the importance of the core
medical value of the patient interest – a value which, as we shall see in the case of innovative treat-
ments, may be challenged by the scientiﬁc interest of creating generalizable knowledge. The role of
patient as consumer thus acts to emphasise the importance of the protection of the patient in the
governance of the patient–doctor relationship.
At the global level, the expression of the consumerist ethos in health care has beneﬁtted from the
liberalising effects of the free movement of goods and services promoted under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization and its General Agreement on Trade in Services (Smith et al. 2009). Sup-
ported by an enabling infrastructure of affordable travel, facilitating agencies, internet-based adver-
tising and information and investment by governments keen to access foreign revenue, the global
market for orthodox health care has expanded rapidly with new suppliers particularly in emerging
economies such as India, China and Singapore. Available treatments span the full range of medical
services but most commonly include dental care, cosmetic surgery, elective surgery and fertility treat-
ment (Lunt et al. 2011). Figures on the market size range from approximately 8 million cross-border
patients generating a market value of USD 24–40 billion per year (Patients Beyond Borders 2013) to a
market size of USD 60 billion and upwards (Herrick 2007, Deloitte 2009).
Similarly in CAM, the evidence is of increasing numbers of active health consumers prepared to
purchase the service they want at a personal cost to themselves rather than rely exclusively on
the advice of doctors and conventional treatment provided through state- or insurance-funded
systems of reimbursement. In the UK, in 2005 the Health Survey of England reported a 26 per cent
prevalence of CAM use in the last 12 months. Internationally the ﬁgure is higher with 12 month preva-
lence of CAM use reported as 62 per cent, 69 per cent and 76 per cent in the Germany, Australia and
Japan (Hunt et al. 2010). In the United States, Eisenberg et al. found that between 1990 and 1997 the
total visits to alternative medical practitioners (deﬁned as a speciﬁc list of 16 therapies) had increased
by 47 per cent from 427 million to 629 million, thereby exceeding total visits to all US primary care
physicians (Eisenberg et al. 1998). More recent data conﬁrm that the trend has continued. The 2007
National Health Interview Survey reported that 38 per cent of American adults had used some type of
CAM during the prior 12 months with an out-of-pocket expenditure of $33.9 billion (Barnes and
Bloom 2008).
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With health consumers providing strong indicators of their willingness to exercise their demand in
the market of non-conventional health care independently of the clinical judgement of doctors, the
suppliers of conventional drugs and therapies recognised the market opportunity this represents by
developing their own direct-to-consumer (DTC) approach (Sullivan 2000). In bypassing the infor-
mation gatekeeping role of the doctor, it is in the interest of industry to encourage demand from
the consumer as well as from the professional. And with consumers increasingly using the internet
not only to access health information but also to inform their health-care decisions, the means to
achieve this are readily available (Powell 2002). In the US, the regulatory changes introduced by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997 and 1999 allowing DTC advertising resulted in an
increase of spending on such advertising from $150 million in 1993 to $4.24 billion in 2005 with
the consequent impact on demand producing an estimated 18 per cent increase in drug expendi-
tures (Dave and Saffer 2010). More recently, DTC advertising has been used to promote a small indus-
try of genetic testing, largely independent of any regulatory control, where consumers can access
genetic information about themselves to predict, diagnose or guide treatment on genetically-
related diseases. Much of the consumer demand in this ﬁeld, particularly in the sub-sector of phar-
macogenomics, is well ahead of the ability of conventional medicine to provide an appropriate
supply (Prainsack 2013).
The increased economic activity of health consumers through markets that operate independently
of the traditional demand-control function of the medical profession has been matched by a rise in the
number and variety of groups representing their interests. Economic and political demand have
expanded together. Traditionally, disease-based patient organisations acted as adjuncts to the
medical science project, helping to gather resources in support of that project through fundraising
and, where providing advice to patients, acting within the medical deﬁnition of patient need (Wood
2000). However, in the last two decades, Europe and the US have witnessed both a rapid increase in
the number of health consumer groups and a broadening of their functions to include service user
groups (eg Survivors Speak Out, Mindlink), condition-related groups (eg National Schizophrenic Fellow-
ship, Manic Depression Fellowship, Depression Alliance) and advocacy groups (eg UK Advocacy
Network) (Allsop et al. 2004). No longer working within the orthodox medical paradigm where the
assumptions of physician knowledge and authority dominate, the new breed of health consumer
groups are prepared to challenge the implications of those assumptions for the operation of the
health-care market by promoting their own distinct deﬁnition of patient demand.
The engagement between the economic and political demands of health consumers is inﬂuenced,
and in some cases stimulated, by the maturity of the sector of the market they inhabit. In the case of
established health-care treatments, CAM and DTC products such as pharmacogenomics, the global
supply can easily meet the consumer demand. In the case of new and emerging therapies, there
are increasingly examples of a mismatch between what health consumers, on the one hand, and
scientists and clinicians, on the other, deem a timely and legitimate supply. As the health consumer
economic demand is thus frustrated, so it translates into both a continuing global search for new
sources of treatment and a political demand for change in the way in which the new supply is gen-
erated through biomedical innovation. Perhaps the most celebrated example of this is the case of
HIV/AIDS where the politicisation of health consumer demand through patient organisations, lobby-
ing and the media caused a radical reassessment of both the role of patients in the biomedical inno-
vation process, particularly with regard to access to clinical trials, and the values that should govern
that process (Levine 1988, Epstein 1996). Other consumer groups who have questioned, and in some
cases rejected, the accepted right of medical science to be the sole arbiter of the patient contribution
to innovations in their own treatment include women, disability groups and those with neuromuscu-
lar disease (Rodwin 1994, Woods and McCormack 2013). The model of patient-driven research is
becoming a public reality (Zhavoronkov and Cantor 2013). So although the orthodox model by
which new health therapies are researched and developed remains politically intact, precedents
have been established for its underlying values and legitimacy to be challenged and changes pro-
posed (Rabeharisoa and Callon 2002).
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Turning now to the stem cell therapy market, we encounter a consumer demand expressed across
the considerable range of diseases mentioned earlier, constantly encouraged by a stem cell science
optimistic of many and various health beneﬁts, to a degree that has been described as amounting to
‘promissory politics’ (Morrison 2012). The ‘hype and hope’ of the stem cell science narrative, aided
and abetted by a media diligently pursuing its customary quest for new cures, has fostered large con-
sumer expectations (Murdoch and Scott 2010). Online sources (including the websites of private com-
panies, patient blogs, and internet articles) provide the main basis for health consumer choice (Levine
2010). Suppliers see no reason for denting consumer expectations and demand is enhanced by their
provision of consumer information, which, like the information from stem cell science itself, is unre-
mittingly positive, claiming that the therapies offered provide a safe and efﬁcient treatment for dis-
eases that orthodox Western medicine regards as incurable or difﬁcult to treat (Sipp 2011). In this
sense, consumer information from suppliers continues to be asymmetric, reinforcing the promises
of stem cell science (Lau et al. 2008).
In addition, an important characteristic of global health consumer demand for stem cell therapies
is that it is a product not only of the ‘pull’ factors generated by such positive information but also of
the ‘push’ factors created by the engagement between a consumer’s health status and the domes-
tically available health-care supply. The constraints imposed by a particular disease condition, the
proximity of pain and/or death, and the limits of local treatment serve to structure a calculation of
risks and beneﬁts with its own rationality and values. Such a subjective rationality may be at odds
with that of the external observer, be they scientist, bioethicist or policy-maker, and generate a
robust demand with limited responsiveness to negative information about stem cell therapies and
a high tolerance of health risk (Miller and Joffe 2009). It cannot be assumed that such a consumer
demand will behave in a manner consistent with the values of orthodox models of biomedical inno-
vation. It may display its own logic, dynamic and direction requiring a shorter timescale in the delivery
of new treatments and access to innovation models with the capacity to respond accordingly (Blas-
imme 2013).
As is the case with other sectors of the health-care market such as HIV/AIDS, the collision between
the economic demand for stem cell therapies and the very limited supply available within the juris-
diction of many Western states may metamorphose into political demands for change in the govern-
ance of stem cell innovation to enable the earlier delivery of new treatments. Thus, in the US, an
internet-driven consumer demand for stem cell therapies has fuelled a continuing conﬂict
between the FDA, which has responsibility for stem cell therapies (classifying them as biologic
drugs) and Texas-based Celltex Therapeutics regarding the legality of its treatments. The resulting
tensions between state- and federal-level regulation of the ﬁeld, on the one hand, and debate
within the medical profession about the appropriate contribution to be made by self-regulation to
its governance, on the other, combined to politicize the stem cell therapy market in very visible
fashion (Park 2012, Cyranoski 2013a). Despite attempted rule changes by the Texas Medical Board,
FDA authority prevailed with the result that Celltex moved its operation to Mexico (Cyranoski
2013b). A second example is Italy, where in May 2013 protests by patient groups led the Italian Par-
liament to introduce legal changes to allow experimental stem cell therapies by the Stamina Foun-
dation on 32 terminally ill patients to proceed despite strong opposition from national and
transnational scientiﬁc organizations (Abbott 2013). The resolution of the political conﬂict remains
uncertain following a subsequent report from an expert panel of leading scientists appointed by
the Italian Minister of Health, which concluded that the therapies lacked any scientiﬁc foundation
(Margottini 2013). Nonetheless, regardless of the outcome, stem cell therapy consumers in Italy
have made their political mark in the debate about how stem cell innovation should be constructed.
Innovation model and stem cell therapy supply
The economic and political demand for new stem cell therapies engage with a global supply that
varies in terms of both timing and quantity in accordance with the innovation governance model
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employed. Although the data on the global stem cell therapy market are scanty, it consistently points
towards a supply side largely based in the emerging economies, plus Japan, with a very limited pres-
ence in Western states (Table 1).
The reasons for this imbalance are not hard to ﬁnd. Stem cell innovation in the West is dominated
by Stem Cell Innovation Model I – Scientiﬁc Innovation (Table 2) where, following the orthodox drug
development model, the product does not reach the market until it has passed through the ﬁve
stages of basic research, clinical experimentation, product development, clinical trial and product
approval. The process begins with a proof-of-concept testing based on in vitro research followed
by its application to appropriate pre-clinical animal models. The purpose of this ‘early-phase’ evi-
dence is to deﬁne cells and mechanistic studies in order to validate cellular mechanisms of action
in a given disease. Building on this evidence, clinical studies are conducted with cell-based products
manufactured employing reproducible methods and under controlled conditions. In parallel, clear
documentation of prospectively deﬁned, measureable clinical outcomes is required to establish
safety and efﬁcacy (Scadden and Srivastava 2012, Bravery et al. 2013). Underpinning this approach
are the organising values of science: objectivity, the importance of the scientiﬁc method and the dis-
covery and application of generalisable principles of causality. The objective of stem cell science, as
with all science, is the advancement of knowledge within the rule systems of the scientiﬁc method.
Broadly speaking, the clinical application may be standardized products from a single stem cell
line (allogeneic use) or standardized medical practices or procedures based on autologous stem
cell use. Frequently, the simple linear ﬂow of innovation is interrupted and rendered cyclical by
the results of clinical trials which may require a return to the clinical experimentation stage and
delay or abandonment of the innovation entirely (Webster et al. 2011). Given the high demand for
stem cell therapies, the time and cost of product development required by this model puts it at a
clear market disadvantage with therapies typically taking 12–15 years and approximately €1 billion
to develop – a difﬁcult business model to sustain (Alliance for Advanced Therapies 2013). As a
result, there are only seven approved stem cell therapies generated by this model in the global
market (Mason and Manzotti 2010) (Table 6).
The mismatch between demand and supply that characterises the operation of Model I has
encouraged the emergence of alternative models which seek to meet the demand at an earlier
point in the stem cell innovation process: Model II – Medical Innovation (Western), Model III –
Medical Innovation (Non-Western), and Model IV – Medical Innovation and Scientiﬁc Innovation
(Tables 3, 4 and 5).
Stem Cell Innovation Model II is largely based on the use of the Hospital Exemption within the EU’s
Advanced Medicinal Therapy Products (AMTP) Regulation 1394/2007 and other national provisions,
such as the UK’s ‘Specials’ scheme operating under an exemption under Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/
83/EC, which allow regulated clinician discretion in the provision of therapies that are not licensed
through the ATMP Regulation procedures themselves (Mahalatchimy et al. 2012). As stated in Pream-
ble 6 of the Regulation, in order to provide patients with the possibility of beneﬁting from a custom-
made, innovative, individual treatment in the absence of valid therapeutic alternatives (i.e. respond to
health consumer demand), Article 28 provides an exemption from central authorization for ATMPs
Table 2. Stem cell innovation Model I – scientiﬁc innovation.
Table 3. Stem cell innovation Model II – medical innovation (Western).
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that are prepared on a non-routine basis and used in a hospital within the same Member State for an
individual patient in accordance with a medical prescription by a clinician (Hospital Exemption).
Formal authorisation is still required but this occurs through national, rather than EU, regulatory pro-
cedures. Rooted in the professional space of the hospital clinician as opposed to that of the medical
scientist, Model II is primarily legitimised through the authority of the clinician as caring professional
rather than the authority of the biomedical scientiﬁc method within the innovation process, though
the latter still has some part to play. As such it constitutes an example of medical innovation, where
the goal is the beneﬁt of the individual patient, as distinct from scientiﬁc innovation which character-
ises Model I, where the goal is scientiﬁcally generalizable results (Lindvall and Hyun 2009).
Thus deﬁned by the International Society for Cell Therapy (ISCT), ‘Medical innovation in cellular
therapy may be viewed as the ethical and legitimate use of non-approved cell therapy by
qualiﬁed health-care professionals in their practice of medicine’ (Gunter et al. 2010: 966). Similarly,
the International Cellular Medicine Society (ICMS) deﬁnes it as ‘the clinical application of innovative
therapy that is based upon good patient care, is intended to improve or ameliorate an individual
patient’s condition and evidences a reasonable chance of success for the patient being treated’ (Inter-
national Cellular Medicine Society 2016). It must be scientiﬁcally based and safe but does not have to
include clinical trials and the therapy may remain unproved. Such medical innovation is regarded as a
form of practice, not research, and therefore, as the Belmont Report points out, its governance falls
within the normal regulation of the professional standards of medical practice by licensing bodies
and medical malpractice laws and not within the purview of science (National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979).
From the perspective of Model I, medical innovation is open to criticism because it fails to
implement the scientiﬁc method fully and therefore inevitably includes unknowns in the chain of
causality with which it is working. This produces a strong scepticism towards the products of such
an approach, in some cases describing them as the ‘new snake oil of the 21st century’ (Dedmon
2009: 340). As Paolo Blanco, a leading stem cell scientist, puts it in an article in Nature: ‘Claiming
the right to market products ahead of proof of efﬁcacy can only bring ineffective products to
market, degrade medicine and impoverish all except, perhaps, the fortunate sellers.’ (Blanco 2013:
255) In common with the global health-care market in general where ‘medical tourism’ is frequently
seen by bioethicists as ethically problematic (Johnston 2010), stem cell consumers are seen to be
subject to the exploitative character of the market and restricted in their ability to make informed
choices. As Mason puts it: ‘Stem cell tourism is undoubtedly a growing menace to vulnerable patients
and their care-givers, potentially inﬂicting physical, psychological and major ﬁnancial damage at a
most difﬁcult time of their lives’ (Mason 2010: 684). The implications of this perspective for the
supply side is that stem cell clinicians involved in medical innovation may be perceived as ‘predators
disguised as life-saving physicians’ driven by proﬁt alone (Mason 2010: 683).
Table 4. Stem cell innovation Model III – medical innovation (Non-Western).
Table 5. Stem cell innovation Model IV – medical innovation and scientiﬁc innovation.
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Nonetheless, the implementation in EU Member States of Stem Cell Innovation Model II through
the Hospital Exemption has created the opportunity for a legal market of authorised stem cell therapy
products to emerge within the province of the clinical professional which parallels, and to an extent
competes with, that of the ATMP centrally approved therapies market pursued by Model I. The effect
of the procedural and legitimating shift initiated by Innovation Model II is that, through the use of
what are intended as exceptional regulatory provisions, health consumer demand is met at an
earlier stage in the innovation process than would otherwise be the case. The timing of the supply
to the health consumer is brought forward. As the Alliance of Advanced Therapies points out, the
emergence of this parallel supply may limit the market size and potential return on investment for
future, centrally approved stem cell products (Alliance for Advanced Therapies 2013: 122) – with a
possible negative impact on the economic viability of Scientiﬁc Innovation Model I. Effectively the
two models are competing for position in a common global market and thus creating a more hetero-
geneous supply. And they are not alone.
In common with Model II, Models III and IV provide innovative stem cell therapies in the hospital
setting and use the authority of the clinician to legitimate their approach to innovation (Tables 4
and 5). Both therefore fall within the category of medical innovation. However, whereas Model II
supplies therapies for single or small groups of patients in what is presented, at least in the case
of the Hospital Exemption, as a non-routine exercise, both Models III and IV operate in the governance
jurisdictions of emerging economies such as those of China and India, which allow them to respond
more readily to health consumer demand and routinely provide therapies for large populations of
patients. Models III and IV also share the characteristic that the clinical application of the therapy
is the product: in the case of Model III clinical experimentation is a small or non-existent component
of the engagement with the health consumer (see e.g. NutechMediworld, Xcell, Celltex and Unique
Cell Treatment Clinic). In contrast, Model IV combines elements of medical innovation and scientiﬁc
innovation in a single business model. Companies in this category claim to re-invest some of the
proﬁts from stem cell medical innovation in the funding of the registered clinical trials dealing
with safety and efﬁcacy required for stem cell scientiﬁc innovation, but with regard to different dis-
eases to those addressed by the treatment available through the medical innovation activity (e.g.
Beike Biotechnology, RNL Bio, Chaitanya Stem Cell Therapy Centre) (Sipp 2011) (Not all observers
are convinced that the clinical trials are legitimate and suspect that the registering of clinical trials
is a strategum to give a clinic’s treatments a veneer of legitimacy – Sipp 2009). For example, using
Model IV, Beike Biotechnology offers treatment for chronic and incurable neurodegenerative con-
ditions such as brain injury and Parkinson’s and in the last three years has registered nine self-
funded registered clinical trials for diabetes, lupus nephritis, autism, premature ovarian failure, Duch-
enne muscular dystrophy, progressive multiple sclerosis, liver cirrhosis, hereditary ataxia and burns
(US National Institutes of Health 2013). In addition, Beike has carried out three nationally funded
R&D projects involving collaborating with universities, research institutes and public general hospi-
tals, including an 863 Project funded by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology. Such projects
are only funded following rigorous ethical review (Beike 2016). Publications from the projects are
published in international journals. A similar model is used by the NeuroGen Brain and Spine Institute
in India, which also produces international publications from its studies of stem-cell-based therapy
(NeuroGen Brain and Spine Institute 2016). However, not all providers in the Model III and Model
IV categories are as conscientious and rigorous in their approach to the needs of the patient, and
it is likely that there is a broad spectrum in the quality of clinical treatment supplied.
Market dynamic and the national governance of stem cell innovation
The global market in stem cell therapies is driven by an intense, and apparently unlimited, demand
for cures and treatments serviced by a supply chain that is the product of four different models of
stem cell innovation governance with widely differing levels of responsiveness to health consumer
demand. To explicate the political economy of the engagement between this market dynamic and
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the governance of stem cell innovation, we can combine innovation models and governance jurisdic-
tions to identify eight types of ‘governance domains’ within which can be placed examples of stem
cell therapy suppliers. The structural complexity of the governance of the global stem cell market thus
becomes manifest, as does the difﬁculty of coordinated intervention faced by states and transna-
tional organisations (Table 6). Each governance domain constitutes a set of jurisdictions in which
the four models of innovation can expect different treatments. Companies are therefore likely to
adjust their locations on the basis of which domain provides them with the most supportive, or
least interventionist, regulatory context. As a result, we can anticipate that as regulation changes
so will the movement of stem cell suppliers across governance domains.
For the most part, once a company using Model I has gained market approval in one national jur-
isdiction, it then pursues licenses in others. For example, Osiris, a US-based company, has received
licenses from Health Canada and Medsafe (New Zealand) for its allogeneic stem cell drug-Prochymal®
for the treatment of GvHD in children. In Model II, stem cell therapy is supplied by the clinician
working within the jurisdiction of a single EU Member State. Although there is no data available
for this domain, it is likely that such clinicians may generate their products through their own com-
panies, business laboratories or academic laboratories. Models III and IV contain examples of compa-
nies operating within single and multiple national jurisdictions. Thus, in the case of Model III, Nutech
Mediworld successfully accesses the global market demand for stem cell therapies working solely
within India’s jurisdiction whilst the US-based company Celltex has clinics in Mexico. Likewise, in
the case of Model IV, Zhongyuan Union Stem Cell operates purely within the China jurisdiction
while China-based Beike Biotechnology recruits foreign patients through local branches in the
Czech Republic, Thailand, India and the US, has a clinic in Romania and has cooperative arrangements
with hospitals in India, Thailand and the Philippines.
It is an interesting paradox, and a tribute to the hegemony of Model I values, that although the
vast majority of the stem cell therapy market activity is in the domain of medical innovation
Table 6. Jurisdiction and innovation model: governance domains of stem cell therapy provision.
Stem cell innovation model
Jurisdiction
Model I
Scientiﬁc Innovation
Model II
Medical Innovation (Western)
Model III
Medical Innovation (Non-
Western)
Model IV
Medical and
Scientiﬁc Innovation
Single national
jurisdiction
US FDA Approved
Duke University School
of Medicine (Ducord)
New York Blood Center
(Hemacord)
Australia TGA Approved:
Mesoblas (MPC)
Korea KFDA Approved
FCB-Pharmicell
(Hearticellgram-AMI)
Medipost (Cartistem)
Anterogen (Cuepistem)
Products approved under the
EU’s Hospital Exemption and
other national schemes
NutechMediworld
Bioengineering
corporation
Wu Stem Cells Medical
Centre
Unique Cell Treatment
Clinic
Spectrum Cell Clinic
Chaitanya Stem Cell
Therapy Centre
Zhongyuan Union
Stem Cell
NeuroGen Brain and
Spine Institute
Multiple national
jurisdictions
Health Canada Approved
Osiris (Prochymal)
New Zealand Medsafe:
Osiris (Prochymal)
European Union
Holocar
Cells4Health (Xcell)
Celltex
Therapeutics
Shinjuku Clinic
Hakatain
Nuchi-In Centre for
Regenerative Medicine
Beike Biotechnology
RNL Bio
Notes: ‘Stem cell therapies’ are deﬁned as treatments derived from the manipulation of stem cells. Such treatments may be deliv-
ered by drug or surgical interventions and their precise governance route to approval will vary accordingly.
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(Models II, III and IV), the vast majority of the ofﬁcial policy discourse and public commentary focuses
on the domain of scientiﬁc innovation (Model I): in other words, the discourse neglects, and in some
cases ignores, the role of medical innovation in the market outlined in Table 6. Hence, the regulatory
debate has largely focused on the scientiﬁc innovation stages of clinical experimentation and clinical
trials of Model I, stages which are absent from the medical innovation models. Some early shifts in the
debate are evident in the discussion surrounding initiatives such as the European Medicine Agency’s
(EMA’s) Adaptive Pathway pilot scheme and the US FDA Breakthrough Therapy designation. Both
initiatives allow the introduction of treatments at an earlier stage in the innovation process than per-
mitted by Model I through the use of surrogate endpoints based on the prediction of clinical beneﬁts
as the criteria for conditional licensing (European Medicines Agency 2016, Food and Drug Adminis-
tration 2016). To this extent they are closer to Models III and IV where scientiﬁc proof of the endpoint
of innovation is not required.
Whilst the long history of this model of stem cell innovation in North America, Europe and Japan
has produced governance arrangements that address these innovation components in considerable
detail, governance is less developed in states such as the emerging economies which are still growing
their capacity for innovation in the life sciences. In practice this means that although regulation in the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) reﬂective of Model I assumptions is often formally
present, its implementation is limited by a number of factors (Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2010). An
initial problem is that language may impose a constraint on the translation of Western governance
concepts into appropriate policy measures in a non-Western setting. Thus, for example, ‘clinical
experimentation’ and ‘clinical trial’ are the same word in Chinese ( ) and Russian (кли-
нические исследования). This has not prevented guidance being produced in both China and
Russia but the linguistic limitations are clearly present (China Ministry of Health and China Food
and Drugs Administration 2013, Russia Ministry of Health 2013). In India’s Guidelines for stem cell
research (Draft), there is extensive guidance on ‘clinical research’ and ‘clinical trials’ but the term ‘clini-
cal experimentation’ does not occur (India Council of Medical Research 2012). The confusion created
by an absence of conceptual harmonization of the components of Model I across national jurisdic-
tions is compounded by variations in both the statutory basis of regulation and its effective trans-
lation through a dedicated bureaucracy. For example, although in China guidance on stem cell
innovation is linked to the Drug Administration Law, the Medical Practitioner Law and the Adminis-
trative Regulations on Medical Institutions and in India to Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
this legal authority as yet lacks the appropriate bureaucratic vehicle for effective implementation. At
the same time, in China there is an abundance of governance space within which medical innovation
occurs through the clinician-led professional authority of Models III and IV, subject largely to local self-
regulatory imperatives. This stands in sharp contrast to medical innovation in Model II, where the
safety and quality of the stem cell therapy, if not its effectiveness, may, depending on the EU
Member State, be situated within a speciﬁc set of regulations that constrain the freedom of the
clinician.
Transnational governance and consumer choice
The prevalence of Model I scientiﬁc innovation assumptions in national governance discussions and
the corresponding neglect of the three medical innovation models is reﬂected at the transnational
governance level where there is a preponderance of guidance on the governance of the basic and
pre-clinical stages of stem cell innovation. Underpinned by the work of the UK Stem Cell Bank, the
International Stem Cell Forum (ISCF) and the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR)
and supported by national research funding agencies, an international infrastructure for the govern-
ance of the basic stem cell science developed dealing with both technical and ethical issues of stan-
dardization (Waldby and Salter 2008). From the perspective of this governance infrastructure, it is
then quite natural that guidance dealing with the process of innovation beyond the stages of
basic and pre-clinical research should approach the task with Model I scientiﬁc innovation
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assumptions ﬁrmly in mind: as do the ISSCR’s Guidelines for the clinical translation of stem cells. Here
the view of medical innovation is that it should be used ‘only in exceptional circumstances’ with
seriously ill patients because such innovation is not driven by the principles of the scientiﬁc
method. Rather, the ISSCR states, ‘the main goal of innovative care is to improve an individual
patient’s condition’ – unlike clinical research which ‘aims to produce generalizable knowledge
about new cellular or drug treatments, or new approaches to surgery’ (International Society for
Stem Cell Research 2008: 15). The former value, the ISSCR implies, is of a lower status and signiﬁcance
than the latter, thus justifying the allocation of a marginal position to medical innovation.
In contrast to this, the International Society for Cellular Therapy (ISCT) maintains that medical inno-
vation has an equal status with the science led innovation of Model I and that ‘There is a place for
both paradigms in the cell therapy global community’ (Gunter et al. 2010: 966). Taking a broader
view of stem cell innovation, one that is inclusive of the demand side of the stem cell therapy
market, the ISCT argues that patients and their families or partners ‘should have the right to seek
treatment for their diseases. No entity should withhold this fundamental right unless there is a
high probability of harm to the patient’ (Gunter et al. 2010: 966). Here, for the ﬁrst time, we see
the primacy of the health consumer in the formulation of stem cell innovation governance. Its con-
ceptual impact is signiﬁcant: once consumer demand is accepted as an important value in the con-
struction of the model, it leads to an analysis of the supply side where scientiﬁc innovation and
medical innovation are given equal weight and both assessed in terms not only of their scientiﬁc
integrity but also their ability to respond to health consumer demand. As the ISCT puts it, ‘Patients
not eligible for controlled clinical trials should be able to choose unproved but scientiﬁcally validated
cell therapy medical innovations, if the researchers are competent and those seeking treatment are
truthfully and ethically informed.’ (Gunter et al. 2010: 966). For governance, the implication is that
both medical innovation and the facilitation of consumer choice become an integral part of stem
cell innovation and a new dimension of consumer-oriented rules has to be considered. Taking
forward the development of such new forms of governance is likely to be a complex task requiring
the formation of broad alliances of stakeholders. Recognising this, the ISCT has recently initiated a
debate on unproven cell therapies through the publication of guidance documents designed ‘to
promote a cooperative approach to facilitate the development of safe and effective therapies
while minimizing and balancing risks for patients to ultimately establish a coalition of stakeholders
that fulﬁl the vision of a broad, pro-patient cell therapy alliance’ (Dominici et al. 2015: 1663. See
also International Cellular Therapy Society 2015). The intention is that the coalition will ‘help patients,
research participants, researchers and respective associations to better assess unproven cell-based
interventions in an informed manner and to promote understanding of key ethical, legal and scien-
tiﬁc elements of human subject research’ (Dominici et al. 2015: 1666).
Such a coalition is clearly needed since, as a demand-side governance exercise, the provision of
expert information which will enable potential health consumers to make an informed judgement
on the risks and beneﬁts of a stem cell therapy, be this science or clinician-based innovation, at
present remains a minor governance component in the operation of the global stem cell therapy
market – dominated as it is by supply side governance debates. The ISSCR has produced its
Patient handbook on stem cell therapies and the Australian Stem Cells Foundation its Australian
Stem Cell Handbook. However, the guidance is general rather than disease speciﬁc, structured accord-
ing to the scientiﬁc innovation tenets of Model I, with medical innovation presented as an option
which is only to be used as a ‘one off’ and ‘under exceptional circumstances’. A survey of 25 scientiﬁc
societies and 125 patient advocacy groups dealing with diseases for which stem cell therapy treat-
ments are available found that only 16 per cent of the former and 12 per cent of the latter had infor-
mation on stem cell treatments, the clinical translation process and unproven stem cell innovation
(Master et al. 2014). The study concluded: ‘With some notable exceptions, our investigation revealed
that quality information about stem cell tourism, which also addresses the clinical translation process,
is regrettably lacking in the online public domain’ (Master et al. 2014: 260).
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The potential nonetheless exists for both public and private governance to make a contribution to
the supply of relevant information to consumers of novel stem cell therapies in a manner comparable
to the demand-side governance available in the global market of established health-care treatments. A
debate has already commenced about what forms of public education are required in this ﬁeld, what
types of information should be included and how and by whom it should be delivered (Master et al.
2013). Closely linked to this are studies and discussions of the role of physicians in patients’ decisions
about stem cell treatments, the educational resources they require and the ethics of the relationship
between medical authority and the patient’s right to choose (Levine and Wolf 2012, Caulﬁeld and Zar-
zeczny 2012, Zarzeczny et al. 2014). Such debates could be readily linked to an existing global standard
setting and monitoring market of quality indicators relevant to the cell therapy ﬁeld, one keen to sell its
products to stem cell clinics which need to bolster their clinical respectability in the eyes of potential
clients. In terms of quality of process and safety, an existing market of standardised measures (eg Good
Clinical Practice, Good Manufacturing Practice, Good Laboratory Practice, Good Clinical Practice) is pro-
vided by national, international and private organisations (eg US FDA, European Commission, EMA, UK
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, International Conference on Harmonisation of
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, World Health Organisation)
which some clinics already claim to access. More speciﬁcally, the International Cellular Medicine Society
(ICMS) has produced guidelines for best practice in cell-based medicines (currently under revision) and
has recently formed an alliance with the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) for the production
of a global accreditation programme for stem cell clinics (American Association of Blood Banks 2013).
Thus, for example, the Chinese ﬁrm Beike Biotechnology has AABB accreditation for its somatic cell
facilities and cord blood bank. If health consumers are to make an informed choice about the safety
of the stem cell therapy product they are considering purchasing then clearly they should be aware
of the importance of these standards indicators. Equally, in terms of efﬁcacy, although stem cell
clinics do not publish systematic data on the results of their interventions, there is no reason why con-
sumers should not provide evidence of their experiences through patient-centred websites as is cus-
tomary practice in the wider health-care market (Herrick 2007: 16).
Conclusions
The orthodox model of stem cell innovation is characterized by a supply side focused mode of gov-
ernance where regulation addresses the rules and values that should govern the operation of the
science and its engagement with the patient. The market and consumer demand are not present
in this governance model except to the extent that it is assumed they will welcome the eventual
product. As a hegemonic form, the model maintains its political dominance and the political
economy of stem cell innovation its stability so long as consumers accept that it is the only legitimate
way of producing new stem cell products and no alternative models emerge to challenge that belief.
When those conditions no longer pertain, a fresh dynamic is created and the political economy of
innovation begins to take new directions. As it does so it is fuelled by a growing tide of health con-
sumerism accustomed to making choices not only about the health products purchased but also
about the way in which those products are created and delivered.
In this context, the economic and political signiﬁcance of the four models of stem cell innovation
governance is that they mediate between the consumer demand for, and clinical supply of, stem cell
therapies. Health consumer demand for stem cell therapies highlights the divisions between science-
based and clinician-based models of innovation through its insistence that timescale is a signiﬁcant,
and in some cases a dominant, component of the consumer decision. As a result of this temporal
component of demand, the more responsive medical innovation models have provided the majority
of the global stem cell therapy supply, thus questioning the economic viability of Model I. In reply, the
proponents of the latter model have sought to exclude, or severely limit, the medical innovation
supply through the assiduous propagation of the values and rules of their governance model at
national and transnational levels of governance, emphasising the exceptional nature of any
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medical innovation provision. This, in turn, has provoked a political reaction from health consumers
against the reiteration of the lengthy timescale of the scientiﬁc innovation model and demands for
changes in the modes of innovation governance. Some regulatory adaptations are being made in
response to these political demands with the introduction of predicted clinical beneﬁts and surrogate
endpoints as the means for treatments to be licensed conditionally earlier in the innovation process.
The EMA Adaptive Therapy and the US Breakthrough Therapy are examples of this. Most recently,
Japan has revised its Pharmaceutical Affairs Law to enable the conditional approval of potential thera-
pies after initial safety tests in order to deliver therapies that are deemed safe, but perhaps ineffective,
as quickly as possible to patients who do not otherwise have access to treatment (Nature 2015). How
far these adaptations lead to an explicit acceptance of medical innovation remains to be seen.
The continuing iteration between health consumer demand, changing models of innovation gov-
ernance and clinical supply constitutes the dynamic of the political economy of stem cell innovation
to which governance must respond if it is to remain relevant. At present it remains a political
economy still dominated by the governance hegemony of Model I values and the exclusive assump-
tions this model embodies regarding the very limited acceptability of medical innovation. As yet, the
economic and political issues posed by Models II, III and IV have not carried sufﬁcient weight to chal-
lenge explicitly this hegemony at national and transnational levels in order to allow open discussion
of either more sophisticated modes of supply side medical innovation governance or very basic
demand-side governance. Instead, the models have operated in Western jurisdictions where they
are marginalised and those of the emerging economies where they are tolerated or ignored.
However, it is likely that as consumer choice becomes a more legitimate component of the
debate about stem cell innovation governance, it will lead to an assessment of the appropriateness
of models of scientiﬁc and medical innovation governance in terms not only of their scientiﬁc integ-
rity but also their ability to respond to health consumer demand. The more that consumer demand is
accorded an explicit role in discussions about innovation governance, the more likely it is that
medical innovation will become an accepted feature of the governance agenda.
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